Decision support for choice of security solution: the Aspect-Oriented Risk Driven Development (AORDD)framework

In security assessment and management there is no single correct solution to the identified security problems or challenges. Instead there are only choices and tradeoffs. The main reason for this is that modern information systems and security critical information systems in particular must perform at the contracted or expected security level, make effective use of available resources and meet end-users' expectations. Balancing these needs while also fulfilling development, project and financial perspectives, such as budget and TTM constraints, mean that decision makers have to evaluate alternative security solutions.\ud \ud This work describes parts of an approach that supports decision makers in choosing one or a set of security solutions among alternatives. The approach is called the Aspect-Oriented Risk Driven Development (AORDD) framework, combines Aspect-Oriented Modeling (AOM) and Risk Driven Development (RDD) techniques and consists of the seven components: (1) An iterative AORDD process. (2) Security solution aspect repository. (3) Estimation repository to store experience from estimation of security risks and security solution variables involved in security solution decisions. (4) RDD annotation rules for security risk and security solution variable estimation. (5) The AORDD security solution trade-off analysis and trade-o¤ tool BBN topology. (6) Rule set for how to transfer RDD information from the annotated UML diagrams into the trad-off tool BBN topology. (7) Trust-based information aggregation schema to aggregate disparate information in the trade-o¤ tool BBN topology. This work focuses on components 5 and 7, which are the two core components in the AORDD framework

Estimating ToE Risk Level using CVSS

Security management is about calculated risk and requires continuous evaluation to ensure cost, time and resource effectiveness. Parts of which is to make future-oriented, cost-benefit investments in security. Security investments must adhere to healthy business principles where both security and financial aspects play an important role. Information on the current and potential risk level is essential to successfully trade-off security and financial aspects. Risk level is the combination of the frequency and impact of a potential unwanted event, often referred to as a security threat or misuse. The paper presents a risk level estimation model that derives risk level as a conditional probability over frequency and impact estimates. The frequency and impact estimates are derived from a set of attributes specified in the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The model works on the level of vulnerabilities (just as the CVSS) and is able to compose vulnerabilities into service levels. The service levels define the potential risk levels and are modelled as a Markov process, which are then used to predict the risk level at a particular time

A Graphical Adversarial Risk Analysis Model for Oil and Gas Drilling Cybersecurity

Oil and gas drilling is based, increasingly, on operational technology, whose cybersecurity is complicated by several challenges. We propose a graphical model for cybersecurity risk assessment based on Adversarial Risk Analysis to face those challenges. We also provide an example of the model in the context of an offshore drilling rig. The proposed model provides a more formal and comprehensive analysis of risks, still using the standard business language based on decisions, risks, and value.Comment: In Proceedings GraMSec 2014, arXiv:1404.163

Estimating Impact and Frequency of Risks to Safety and Mission Critical Systems Using CVSS

Many safety and mission critical systems depend on the correct and secure operation of both supportive and core software systems. E.g., both the safety of personnel and the effective execution of core missions on an oil platform depend on the correct recording storing, transfer and interpretation of data, such as that for the Logging While Drilling (LWD) and Measurement While Drilling (MWD) subsystems. Here, data is recorded on site, packaged and then transferred to an on-shore operational centre. Today, the data is transferred on dedicated communication channels to ensure a secure and safe transfer, free from deliberately and accidental faults. However, as the cost control is ever more important some of the transfer will be over remotely accessible infrastructure in the future. Thus, communication will be prone to known security vulnerabilities exploitable by outsiders. This paper presents a model that estimates risk level of known vulnerabilities as a combination of frequency and impact estimates derived from the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The model is implemented as a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN)

Saving Nine Without Stitching in Time: Integrity Check After-the-fact

Electrical substations transform voltage from high to low, or low to high for distribution and transmission, respectively, and are a critical part of our electricity infrastructure. The state of a substation is continuously measured for monitoring, controlling and protection purposes, using synchrophasor measurements. The IEC 61850 standard defines communication protocols for electrical substations, including transmission of synchrophasor measurements. However, IEC 61850 does not properly address cyber security, leaving this critical infrastructure highly vulnerable to cyber attacks. This paper describes the development and testing of a novel mechanism for delayed integrity check for synchrophasor measurements. The results show that the solution manages to detect when integrity of the synchrophasor transmission is compromised, without adding any delay to the time-critical synchrophasor transmission itself.acceptedVersio

Saving Nine Without Stitching in Time: Integrity Check After-the-fact

Electrical substations transform voltage from high to low, or low to high for distribution and transmission, respectively, and are a critical part of our electricity infrastructure. The state of a substation is continuously measured for monitoring, controlling and protection purposes, using synchrophasor measurements. The IEC 61850 standard defines communication protocols for electrical substations, including transmission of synchrophasor measurements. However, IEC 61850 does not properly address cyber security, leaving this critical infrastructure highly vulnerable to cyber attacks. This paper describes the development and testing of a novel mechanism for delayed integrity check for synchrophasor measurements. The results show that the solution manages to detect when integrity of the synchrophasor transmission is compromised, without adding any delay to the time-critical synchrophasor transmission itself.acceptedVersio